We study the continuous time Brown-Robinson ctitious play process for non-zero sum games. We show that, in general, ctitious play cannot converge cyclically to a mixed strategy equilibrium in which both players use more than two pure strategies.
Introduction
This paper studies the \ctitious play" (FP) learning process due to Brown [1] and Robinson [11] . The FP process was originally proposed as a computational tool for determining the value of a two-person zero-sum game. However, it can also be interpreted as a learning process for boundedly rational agents in which each player play s a m y opic best response in each period, on the assumption that the opponent's future actions will resemble the past.
Robinson [11] established the result that the FP process converges in nite two-person zero-sum games. Miyasawa [9] showed the convergence of FP in 22 games. However, the convergence cannot be guaranteed in general non-zero sum games as an example due to Shapley [14] shows.
We nd it convenient t o w ork with a continuous time formulation of ctitious play (referred to as CFP) rather than the discrete time formulation proposed by Brown [1] . While the convergence results cited above w ere for the discrete process, both hold for the continuous time process also, as does Shapley's counterexample. Our main result (Theorem 3) is that CFP almost never converges cyclically to a mixed strategy equilibrium in which both players use more than two pure strategies. In a recent paper, Hofbauer [6] has made a related conjecture: if CFP converges to a regular mixed strategy equilibrium, then the game is zero-sum.
As is well-known, the interpretation of mixed strategy equilibria is problematic (see, for instance, Rubinstein [13] ). In two person zero sum games a justication for mixed strategies is that the \correct" probabilities provide the best defense against the opponent. But in non-zero sum games a justication on defensive grounds cannot be made. A point of view originating with Harsanyi [4] takes the position that the equilibrium probabilities represent only the subjective beliefs of other players about the behavior of a particular player; thus it is not necessary to assume that players actually choose randomized strategies. Fictitious play and associated learning procedures suggest a way in which such beliefs can form over time by means of a gradual process. However, learning procedures can serve to justify mixed strategy equilibria only in circumstances in which the procedures converge to an equilibrium. Our result shows that, in general non-zero sum games, mixed strategy equilibria cannot be limits of a ctitious play process and thus are inherently unstable.
The behavior of dynamical processes in the presence of mixed equilibria has previously been examined in a related context by Crawford [2] . Crawford [2] studies a class of learning procedures in which (a) players have a nite memory; and (b) play mixed strategies which are adjusted in response to the dierence in payos from playing a particular pure strategy and the mixed strategy against the actual play in the recent past. Crawford [2] then shows that mixed strategy equilibria are generally unstable. The procedures considered do not include the CFP; they are more akin to evolutionary processes like the so called \replicator dynamics."
Evolutionary dynamical systems are considered in more detail by Hofbauer and Sigmund [7] . Their results also suggest that mixed strategy equilibria are unstable in general (asymmetric) bimatrix games (see Section 27.5 of [7] ).
In other, more closely related work, Fudenberg and Kreps [3] study interpretational issues concerning mixed strategies and learning processes like FP. They propose some alternative systems based on ideas stemming from Harsanyi's [4] purication theorem and derive convergence results for 2 2 games. Jordan [8] points out other diculties in interpreting the convergence of learning processes to mixed equilibria. In particular, he points out that the convergence concerns players' expectations and not strategies or payos.
Fictitious Play
Let G = ( A; B) b e a t w o-player game where A and B are I J matrices. We will refer to I = f1; 2; : : : ; I gand J = f1; 2; : : : ; J gas the sets of pure strategies available to players 1 and 2 respectively. As usual, if player 1 chooses strategy i and player 2 chooses strategy j, the payo to player 1 is a ij and the payo to player 2 is b ij . The sets of mixed strategies are denoted by ( I ) and (J) respectively. Let i 2 (I) be the mixed strategy that assigns weight 1 t o i . W e will identify i with i and write i 2 (I) instead of i 2 (I).
For all q 2 (J), let BR(q) be the set of pure strategy best responses for player 1 and denote by supp q = fj : q j > 0g the support of q. As 0, we obtain dp(t) dt = i (t) p(t) t This is not dened for t = 0, so the continuous time version should start at some t 0 > 0; say t 0 = 1. This leads to the following denition:
For t 1; the path (p(t); q ( t )) is a continuous time ctitious play process (CFP) if (p(1); q (1)) 2 (I) (J); and dp(t) dt = i (t) p(t) t ; dq(t) dt = j (t) q(t) t where i (t) 2 BR(q(t)) and j (t) 2 BR(p(t)):
The discrete time ctitious play process (DFP) is also known as the \Brown-Robinson Learning Process" ( [1] , [11] ). In this paper, we nd it convenient t o w ork with its continuous time version (CFP). We hope to explore whether our results continue to hold for the discrete process (DFP) later.
It is well known that if the DFP (or CFP) (p(t); q ( t )) converges to (p ; q ) ; then (p ; q ) is a Nash equilibrium of G:
Cyclic Play Under ctitious play, each player always plays a best response against the empirical distribution of the opponent's play. Under CFP, therefore, when a player switches from one pure strategy to another he is precisely indierent b e t w een these two strategies. This fact is crucial for our analysis. Let t 0 = 1 and let (t 1 ; t 2 ; t 3 ; :::) be the times when some player switches his/her strategy. (In an exceptional case, both players may switch a t t h e same instant.) Let (i tn ; j t n )( i ( t ) ; j ( t )) for t 2 (t n ; t n +1 ) denote the choices in the interval (t n ; t n +1 ). The interval (t n ; t n +1 ) consists of a string of consecutive plays of (i tn ; j t n ) ;referred to as a run. The run-length is t n+1 t n .
The sequence of play is the sequence of pure strategy combinations:
(i t 0 ; j t 0 ) ; ( i t 1 ; j t 1 ) ; ( i t 2 ; j t 2 ) ; :::; (i tn ; j t n ) ; ::: The sequence of play i s e v entually cyclic if there is K and N such that (i tn ; j t n ) = ( i t n + K ; j t n + K ) for all n > N . Cyclic play has been called \quasi-periodic" play b y Rosenm uller [12] . If the CFP converges to some Nash equilibrium (p ; q ) and the sequence of play i s e v entually a cycle, we will refer to it as cyclic convergence.
We wish to alert the reader that cyclic play refers to the fact that pure strategy combinations are played in a xed pattern and not that the trajectory (p (t) ; q ( t ) ) reaches a limit cycle. As a simple example, note that for \matching pennies" the sequence of play resulting from a CFP may be, for instance, (H;H);(H;T);(T;T);(T;H) and is thus cyclic while the trajectory (p (t) ; q ( t )) converges to the unique Nash equilibrium.
The Main Result
Our main result is that it is rare for CFP to converge cyclically to a mixed strategy equilibrium in which both players use more than two pure strategies. The proof of Theorem 3 is somewhat involved and so we rst present a brief outline of the argument.
An Outline of the Proof
Fictitious play (CFP) is a continuous time non-linear and non-autonomous dynamical system. The rst step is to reformulate the system so that the problem reduces to the study of an associated (discrete) linear and autonomous system. Once this is done, standard tools can be brought t o b e a r on the problem. In the second step, these tools are employed to analyze the linear dierence equation system and obtain the main result.
The method we employ is to x a particular (arbitrary) cycle of play, where each player uses at least three dierent pure strategies. 1 We then show that, for generic games, if this cycle is played the CFP does not converge. Since there are only countably many possible cycles, for generic games, cyclic convergence involves at most two pure strategies for each player.
Step 1: Reduction When the play is cyclic, a sequence of choices (i 1 ; j 1 ) ; ( i 2 ; j 2 ) ; ( i 3 ; j 3 ) ; :::; (i K ; j K ) are repeated over and over in the same order. K consecutive runs corresponding to the choices (i 1 ; j 1 ) ; ( i 2 ; j 2 ) ; ( i 3 ; j 3 ) ; :::; (i K ; j K ) i s a r ound. T h us, cyclic play consists of rounds r = 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; ::: A run corresponding to the choice (i k ; j k ) is referred to as a k-run. Let n k (r) denote the length of the k-run in round r, that is, n k (r) is the amount of time spent playing (i k ; j k ) in round r. Let n(r) = ( n 1 ( r ) ; n 2 ( r ) ; : : : n K ( r )).
We will argue that if the CFP is cyclic, then there exists a K K matrix F such that for all r n(r + 1 ) = F n ( r ) (1) Since CFP is completely determined by the associated system determining the run-lengths, the problem has been reduced to the study of a linear dierence equation. This reduction also appears in Rosenm uller [12] .
Step 2: Analysis of F The behavior of the discrete linear dynamical system (1) is determined by Eigen roots of F, and in the long run the evolution is determined by the dominant Eigen root. The crucial fact (Lemma 5) is that the product of the non-zero Eigen roots of F is one. Suppose each player uses at least three pure strategies in the cycle. We show that generically, not all Eigen roots of F can have absolute value equal to one. Thus, there exists an Eigen root of F such that jj > 1. Then, for generic initial conditions, the run-lengths increase exponentially, as in Shapley's [14] example, and CFP does not converge.
It is important to note that, in this proof, we x a particular cycle (where each player uses at least three pure strategies) and show that for generic games, CFP does not converge along this cycle. But since there are only countably many possible cycles, generically there is no cycle such that CFP will converge.
For non-generic classes of games (such as zero sum games) it may w ell happen that all non-zero Eigen roots of F have absolute value equal to one, which allows for convergence. We consider this issue in Section 8.
The Determination of the Run-Lengths
We start by assuming that CFP proceeds along a cycle ((i 1 ; j 1 ) ; ( i 2 ; j 2 ) ; ( i 3 ; j 3 ) ; :::
We will argue that there exists a K K matrix F (which depends on the particular cycle and on the payo matrices) such that for all r; n(r + 1 ) = F n ( r ) : (2) Let ( 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; I ) denote the I rows of A and let ( 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; J ) denote the J columns of B. Let P 0 and Q 0 be vectors denoting the total amount o f time each player has used each strategy prior to the start of round r. I t i s convenient to write n = n(r) and n 0 = n(r + 1 ) :
Dene an I K matrix P by:
and a J K matrix Q by:
Observe that (P n ) i is the amount of time player 1 played strategy i in round r and (Qn) j is the amount of time player 2 played strategy j in round r. Notice also that i k Q = ( a i k j 1 ; a i k j 2 ; :::; a i k j K ) and j k P = (b i 1 j k ; b i 2 j k ; :::; b i K j k ).
Let e k denote the kth K-dimensional unit vector. It is convenient t o dene the K K matrix:
E k = ( e 1 ; e 2 ; : : : ; e k ; 0 ; : : : ; 0) (5) whose rst k columns are the rst k unit vectors and the last (K k) columns are 0. By denition, E K = I, the identity matrix. We also have E k n = (n 1 ; n 2 ; :::; n k ; 0; :::; 0). Round r Equations Under CFP, when a player switches from one pure strategy to another he is precisely indierent b e t w een these two strategies. Using this fact, we nd that the players switch from (i 1 ; j 1 ) t o ( i 2 ; j 2 ) in round r when: (8) and ( j 2 j 1 )P E 1 n= ( j 2 j 1 ) P 0 (9) Typically, of course, only one of the two players will switch strategies in the transition from (i 1 ; j 1 ) t o ( i 2 ; j 2 ), and thus only one of equations (8) or (9) will be non-trivial. For instance, if only player 1 switches strategies, that is, if i 2 6 = i 1 but j 2 = j 1 , then (9) is trivially satised and hence redundant. b isj k n s (11) which can be rewritten as:
and
where we always write K + 1 1 :
Round (r+1) Equations By the earlier arguments, for k = 1 ; 2 ; :::; K;
when the players switch from (i k ; j k ) t o ( i k +1 ; j k +1 ) in round r + 1 w e h a v e:
The Basic Dierence Equation By substituting (12) and (13) into (14) and (15) respectively, w e obtain for k = 1 ; 2 ; :::; K : Let (k) 2 f 1 ; 2 g denote the player who switches after k:
For convenience, we usually assume player one is the rst to switch i n each round ((1) = 1) and player 2 the last ((K) = 2).
Consider the system of equations that results when out of equations (16) Evaluating the determinant b y expanding along the last row yields: det Proof. The proof is by induction on ; the number of reversions in the cycle of play.
Initial
Step ( = 2 )In this step we show that, generically, i f = 2 then the algebraic multiplicity of the unit root is two. It is useful to initially consider the simple cycle where the players alternate in switching strategies. That is, for all k; (k)6 =(k+ 1).
We m a y assume without loss of generality that (k) = 1 if and only if k is odd, and perhaps after a relabeling of strategies, write the cycle as Observe that for this matrix: So far we h a v e only considered the simple cycle (31). However, the analysis for more complicated switching patterns is similar. A cycle where players switch several times consecutively results, after some rearrangement o f r o ws and columns, in a matrix similar to L (1) : One then checks that a determinant similar to (34) is not zero. The somewhat laborious details can be found in Appendix B.
We h a v e t h us established that for generic games, when = 2, the algebraic multiplicity of the unit root is 2:
The Induction Step Suppose there exists 2 such that the statement of Lemma 6 is true for any cycle such that 1 + 2 = . N o w consider an arbitrary cycle c of length K in which the number of reversals is 1 + 2 = +1.
Since + 1 3, there is a player, say player 1, who switches \back" to some strategy during the cycle. We m a y , for simplicity, suppose that this occurs in run K 1. Moreover, we can relabel the strategies so that the cycle c is 
which is the same as c except that the sequence (( 1); ; 1) at the end has been replaced by the shorter sequence ( ( 1); ( 1)1). In c player 1 makes a direct transition from strategy ( 1) to strategy 1. Otherwise the cycle is as before.
Note that the number of reversions in c is . Let C D denote the matrix corresponding to the cycle c: We n o w claim that X = C D. Indeed, the elements in (35) and (36) are the entries in the last column of X, and they correspond to a run where player 1 uses 1 and player 2 uses 1. This is precisely the last run in the cycle c: Similarly, the last row of the matrix X corresponds to a switch from strategy 1 to strategy 1 by player 1. The other rows and columns have not been disturbed, and hence X = C D.
We h a v e shown that we can write It can then be checked that (40) holds. Now consider the matrix T() that results when the row and column operations described above are performed on C D (rather than on C D). To 
where again we h a v e that jT 1 ()j = jC Dj. There are K 1 remaining Eigen roots. Since K = 2 + 2, the number of remaining roots is odd. Since the number of complex roots is always even, there is an odd number of real roots. Not all of these can equal 1 since from Lemma 5 we h a v e, +1 +2 ::: K 1 = 1 This implies that there is a non-zero real root, say +1 ; such that +1 6 = 1 or 1 and hence j +1 j 6 = 1. Since the product of all non-zero roots is one, there exists a root, s such that j s j > 1: Let S be the dominant root, that is, the root with the largest absolute value. If S is either negative o r complex, the cycle cannot persist since run-lengths would become negative. Thus S must be real and positive and hence S > 1.
The nal step of the argument is similar to that used by Shapley [14] . Consider the (arbitrary) vectors P 0 and Q 0 that describe the \initial conditions" before the cycle begins. Let n(0) be the vector of run lengths in the initial round that the cycle is played. We know from (12) and (13) where as above, S is the dominant root. Since S > 1 the run-lengths grow exponentially. Hence, as in Shapley [14] , for generic initial conditions, CFP cannot converge.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
Discussion
The class of 2 2 games forms an exception to our main result: there is open set of 2 2 games with a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies for which e v ery CFP is convergent. However, it can be shown that every 2 2 game with a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies has the same bestresponse correspondence as a zero-sum game. Since CFP depends only on the best-response correspondence, the 2 2 exception is a consequence of this equivalence. We n o w present an example in order to demonstrate that there exist (non-generic) non-zero sum games and initial conditions for which CFP can converge to a mixed strategy equilibrium in which more than two strategies are used.
\Rock-Paper-Scissors": R P S R 0; 0 1; ; 1 P ; 1 0; 0 1; S 1 ; ; 1 0; 0 There exists a unique equilibrium which is completely mixed: each player assigns equal probabilities to each of the three pure strategies.
The game is symmetric and hence non-generic. Consider a CFP process with an initial condition satisfying p(1) = q(1): Notice that the initial condition is also non-generic.
It can be shown that if 1; any such CFP converges in a cyclical manner; both players play the same pure strategy at all times and follow the cycle: (R; R) (P;P) (S; S) : Notice that if > 1 ; the product of the non-zero roots is less than 1; and thus the conclusion of Lemma 5 does not hold. This is because in the cycle given above, both players switch simultaneously. Recall that the assumption that the players did not switch simultaneously played an important role in the proof of Lemma 5.
Thus we h a v e a family of games in which CFP converges cyclically to a mixed strategy equilibrium with more than two strategies; of course, the class of games is non-generic, as are the initial conditions. 
Thus, jM(1)j is of the form (48), and by the corollary to Lemma 9, jM(1)j 6 = 0 . T h us, again the algebraic multiplicity of the unit root is 2 (for generic games).
Similarly, if there are several places in the cycle where a player switches twice in a row, we can reduce the matrix jC Dj to the form (48). This procedure is the same as the one that resulted in (50). Each time we \reduce" a sequential switch, in the rst two r o ws one of the j will change from one to zero, just as 1 became zero in (51 Then, in columns 3 and 7, the 1 and 3 will change from 1 to zero, but in column 5, 2 = 1. By the corollary to Lemma 9, the determinant is still nonzero. Thus, if during the cycle any n umber of times players switch t wice in a row, the algebraic multiplicity of the unit root is still 2 (for generic games). If some player switches three or more consecutive times, the procedure is the same. By rearranging rows and columns, we can obtain a matrix of the form (48) which is non-singular. Note that there must exist a run k , 1 < k < , such that (i) (k ) = 2 and (k + 1) = 1, and (ii) i k i 6 = 1 and j k j 6 = 1. This is because player one cannot switch from strategy 1 to 2 to ... back to 1 again consecutively, but player 2 must make some switch in-between, and a similarly player 1 cannot make consecutive switches from 1 to 2 to ... back to 1. (In the case of (52) take k = 5, whence i = j = 3).
It will suce to illustrate this with the cycle h11; 21; 31; 41; 42; 43; :::(i ; j 1); (i ; j ) ; ( i + 1 ; j ) ; ::::; 1i
Here player 1 switches thrice in succession (from 1 to 2 to 3 to 4) and then player 2 switches three times. In this case, we operate on the matrix C D as follows. If we replace column 4 by (column 3 column 4 + column 5) and interchange rows 3 and 4, we obtain a matrix M 1 () It is clear how to proceed this way, to obtain a matrix M() which, when = 1, corresponds to the matrix C D for the simple cycle where (k) 6 = (k+1). In fact, for any , columns k 1; k and k +1ofM() will be identical to columns k 1; k ; k + 1 of the matrix C D for the simple cycle. This is because none of the operations will have aected these columns. Refer to the case (52), where columns 4, 5 and 6 remained unchanged.
If we then, in the matrix M(1) sum the rows corresponding to player 1's (resp. player 2's) switches to obtain a matrix of the form (48), at least one of the j for j < 1 will be non-zero (viz. in the column k , since this was true for the matrix corresponding to the simple cycle). By the corollary to Lemma 9, jM(1)j 6 = 0 .
